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Introduction
Microeconomic models of the firm typically assume a production function, sometimes with labor inputs disaggregated into managerial and production labor (and perhaps clerical labor as a separate category). Yet little is known about the ways in which managers augment production. For example, do managers directly affect the productivity of their subordinates, and if so, how? Knowledge of such effects is potentially important for studying many issues in economics, including for example wage inequality. Suppose, for instance, that managers are complementary inputs with certain types of labor, such as less skilled workers; for example, less skilled workers may need more supervision or training by managers than more highly skilled workers would. If so, then exogenous increases in the supply of unskilled labor (caused perhaps by immigration from less developed countries) will raise the relative demand for managers, and overall wage inequality will rise by more than one might have thought. Conversely, if the two kinds of labor are substitutes, then the relative demand for managers would fall, reducing the rise in wage inequality. For example, it is possible that unskilled workers could take over some basic monitoring functions from management.
Knowledge about the ways in which managers contribute to organizational success is also crucial in the study of human resource management. Researchers in that field are concerned with the roles of managerial expertise and the motivation of subordinates. The same questions that are of interest to applied microeconomists such as substitutability across factors of production are also important to firms, as they decide on their best strategies for combining managerial and production worker expertise.
The nature of the production relationship between supervisors and subordinates is difficult to study in most settings. Often there are only rather imperfect measures of output, and firm-level data on combinations of various kinds of labor inputs are usually hard to obtain. Data on sports leagues can be ideal in this situation because output is observable, and we have detailed measures of the qualifications of managers and who their subordinates are. This paper uses data from British professional football to study the issues of substitution and complementarity between managers and subordinates. We exploit British football data for the 1994-2007 seasons to study whether managers' skills substitute for or complement players' skills. We do this by examining interaction terms in frontier production analyses where team success is the measure of output. Managers' skills are proxied by information on the level at which they played (if they played at all), as well as their degree of experience as managers, while player skills are proxied by the relative payroll (for players) of the team in a given season. Unlike previous research on managerial productivity in soccer (e.g. Dawson, Dobson and Garrard 2000a and b; Dawson and Dobson 2002; Frick and Simmons 2008) , we study the interaction between managerial skill and player skill. Unlike earlier work, our approach allows managerial talents to differently affect players of different skill levels and thereby provides additional insights into production relationships.
Our strongest findings are for the Premier League (the highest level of competition). We estimate frontier production functions where output is defined as the team's finishing position relative to other teams in the league in a given season. Our findings indicate that other things being equal, managers who played at a higher level raise the productivity of lesser skilled teams by more than that of more highly skilled teams. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that one of the functions of a highly skilled manager is to teach subordinates some of the skills needed to succeed. The value of this teaching is, according to our results, greater the less skilled the players are, an intuitively plausible result. An additional finding, however, suggests that other things being equal (including the manager's playing ability), managers with more accumulated professional managing experience raise the productivity of more skilled players by more than that of less skilled players. This finding is consistent with the idea that another function of successful managers in high pressure, high performance workplaces may be to manage the egos of the workers involved. This function is likely more important the more accomplished the workers are, as indicated in our data by teams with higher relative payroll levels. Our findings, then, suggest that managerial skills are multidimensional, including instruction as well as an ability to coax peak levels of performance from high ability workers. These results may have some relevance to high performance workplaces such as professional law or consulting practices, high tech innovative companies or research universities.
Expectations and Previous Research on Managerial Productivity in Sports
To develop hypotheses about the effect of management, some researchers have attempted to break down into component parts the functions that executives perform. For example, after observing several chief executives, Mintzberg (1973, pp. 54-94) concluded that there were roles common to successful managers. First, an executive serves as a leader and a liaison with those outside the organization. Second, successful managers engage in monitoring the work of subordinates. Finally, the manager must use the information gathered to make decisions. An important aspect of successful leadership is an ability convince employees to act in the best interests of the firm. For example, Loch et al. (2000) emphasize that it is important for managers to create a culture in which individuals submerge their egos for the common good. In this view, managers need to be seen as credible if subordinates are to be willing to accept advice and show humility.
Credibility can be attained through several routes, including having expertise as well as having a record of achievement as a manager (Goodall 2009a and b; Kouzes and Posner 2003 ). In addition, Butler and Waldroop (1999) discuss successful strategies for motivating and retaining highly skilled employees. The authors stress the importance for managers to learn what really matters to their star employees in order to design their jobs in such a way as to enhance their loyalty to the company.
The roles these authors have emphasized for managers in general also are relevant for team managers in sports. In the sports context, two dimensions of successful management seem especially relevant for our study of the relationship between leader and subordinate in soccer: the teaching function (corresponding to the monitoring role mentioned by Mintzberg, 1973) and convincing players to subordinate their egos for the betterment of the team (a function which draws on all three roles Mintzberg, 1973 mentioned). Of course, a manager's credibility enhances both of these dimensions. Wanderers. The authors note that the team successfully implemented a long-run strategy of bringing in low cost, inexperienced players, and using a highly skilled manager, Sam Allardyce, to train them (p. 420). In both of these instances, the teaching function is seen as clearly more valuable for less skilled subordinates, who presumably have more to learn about playing the sport at a high level than established stars do. Allardyce is known for his ability to get the best out of teams of previously under-performing individual players (Bridgewater 2010) .
Second, on managing the egos of the highly skilled athletes in professional sports, Phil Jackson, the National Basketball Association coach who has won more league championships (11) than any other coach, is known for taking over teams with established stars who weren't winning. He then managed the strong egos on these teams and won multiple championships. Whether a manager has himself played soccer at a high level can contribute to both of these roles a successful manager plays. For example, managers who were great players may be able to impart skills and insights to the current generation of players, suggesting a positive impact of the manager's prior playing skill on team success. For example, as suggested by Goodall, Kahn and Oswald (forthcoming) in the context of North American professional basketball, this impact may come about through several possible routes:
 Perhaps this is the coach's acquired skill based on the in-depth knowledge of what wins games.  Perhaps the manager has played for and gained useful skills from great coaches.  Perhaps some "tenacious personality" factor is at work. What made someone a winner as a player makes him a winner as a coach.  Maybe this is even something genetic that makes the person a winner.
In football terms, having been a great player might be expected to provide several types of expertise which could be useful to the manager.
 Great players might lead by example.  As in the case of basketball just discussed, a great player might be able to demonstrate a particular football skill, or to spot a potentially great player.  A manager who was a great player may have an understanding of how the game should be played at the highest level and often played in the most successful clubs under successful managers and acquiring good training and nutritional habits.  Players at higher levels may have networks among better clubs. Even if the manager is working at lower level, he might be able to use his name and contacts to attract good players, or to get loans from the second string of higher level clubs.  Perhaps the reputation and credibility of being a great player impresses the players of today.  All of these might reasonably help top players create a culture and help the manager to become a visionary and inspirational leader who players want to follow.
While better players may indeed make better managers, going in the opposite direction is the possibility that a manager who was a great player may not be able to identify with journeymen players and understand what motivates them. For example, one manager who had, himself, played at the top but managed in lower leagues complained of his players:
"They just couldn't do the things that I was used to players being able to do. We would work on something in training, for example how to defend a corner, and everyone would know who they were marking in that situation. The next match someone would not be marking their man and we would concede from a corner in the same silly way. It was very frustrating." (Bridgewater 2010, p. 74) .
In addition to affecting the average quality of play, the manager's playing ability may have differing effects on team success depending on the innate abilities of the players. For example, as noted, more highly skilled players may have less to learn than less skilled players. significantly raises a manager's productive efficiency. In addition, the authors find that former forwards make more technically efficient managers. Finally, a recent study of German soccer examines several factors that affect the degree to which managers bring the team closer to productive efficiency (Frick and Simmons 2008) . Specifically, head coaches who earn more money and who have better career coaching records lead to significantly more productive efficiency than otherwise.
Our study builds on this previous research in the following ways. First, and most importantly, unlike previous literature, we estimate the degree of substitutability between managerial skill and playing skill in the production process. As discussed in the introduction, substitution/complementarity relationships are fundamental in helping one understand the determinants of relative factor prices as well as from the point of view of managing human resources. Like Dawson and Dobson (2002) Third, unlike previous research on European football, we provide separate analyses of leagues below the Premier League in addition to the top league itself.
Because the level of play is lower in the lesser leagues, it is potentially useful to compare results across leagues, since the large variation in playing ability across leagues allows for a fuller examination of the production function than merely concentrating on top level performers. And production relationships may differ depending on the level of play, implying that one shouldn't pool leagues in estimating production functions and efficiency. Specifically, the teaching and inspiring functions of managers may be more important for lower leagues in which the players have more to learn, while the ego management function is likely more important in the Premier League, where the biggest stars play.
The Setting: English Football
Competition in English football (soccer) is split into four leagues. 
Data and Empirical Procedures
The data used in this paper are the official statistics on football manager Our aim is to determine whether expert leaders raise the productivity of highly productive workers by more than for less productive workers. In other words, is managers' expertise a substitute for or complement with production workers' expertise?
Like several recent papers on the efficiency of management in sports discussed earlier, we take a structural approach which recognizes that the players are the direct input to team success, but where the manager can move the organization toward productive efficiency, when the team achieves its potential output. As discussed, such a design has been termed a frontier production function analysis, and we seek to determine whether expert leaders have larger effects in reducing inefficiency for less productive than for more productive workers.
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The data points are each a manager-team-season observation. We use as dependent variable the log of the team's finishing position minus the log of the average team's finishing position for that season, where a larger value means better performance. For example, in a 22 team league, the first finisher gets a 22 and the worst team gets a 1. We then take the logs of these values and subtract the mean of the log of the finishing positions for the given league and year, in order to take into account league size. Giving the best team the largest value (as opposed to the smallest value) transforms the dependent variable into a positive indicator of output. Taking logs of course reduces the differences between extreme observations. We define the manager's playing expertise in a series of dummy variables with four categories:
1. Those who played internationally and in their top domestic league. The requirement to have been both an international player and to have played in the top domestic league is decided upon because some smaller international teams may take players who are the best of that nationality but are not playing at the highest level. So, for example, Wales and Northern Ireland (and Scotland) have international players who are playing in the second tier of the English game.
Those who played in their top domestic league but not internationally.
These last groups of international but not highest league players are also put into this category on the basis of their international caps, even if their league careers would not have put them into this group.
Those who played in leagues below the top level in their country
Any manager who played professionally but not in the highest league.
Those who did not play professionally
While there are not many managers who fall into this category, there are still some. For example, Jose Mourinho is in this category, as was Stuart Murdoch at MK Dons and Lennie Lawrence at the various clubs he has managed.
An additional measure of managerial quality is the amount of managerial experience. This is the case since there is learning by doing and also because the better managers are asked back for future contracts. In either instance, managerial experience is likely to be positively correlated with managerial quality. Since actual performance may affect teams' decisions to employ managers in future years, experience may be endogenous, and we therefore report some results which do not control for experience.
We measure managerial playing ability and experience relative to the league average for the given season, since the dependent variable is also a relative measure for a given season.
We note that several studies of managerial efficiency in sports control for whether the manager previously played for the current team and also current tenure. We do not control for such factors, since they are likely to be endogenous with respect to current performance. For example, teams are likely to keep their successful managers (raising current tenure), especially if they previously played for the team (producing a positive correlation between having played for the team and winning as a manager). By excluding such variables, we in effect estimate a reduced form. Our earlier theoretical discussion suggested that managerial skill was multidimensional (i.e. it includes activities such as teaching and ego management).
Moreover, we argued that the importance of these dimensions differed across levels of subordinates' playing ability. We therefore estimated equations 1) and 2) estimated separately by the four leagues in British football, although we will refer briefly to some estimates on the pooled sample. Because of the problems of repeat observations on individual managers, we estimated the standard errors by bootstrapping, using 20
replications. We had mostly complete payroll data for 1994-2007 for the top two leagues and 1994-2001 for the two lower level leagues. 9 Thus, these are the years for which we estimate these models, and we now turn to a description of the results.
We recognize that there may be endogenous matching between certain types of teams and managers with particular skills. For example, a team with fans who have a high willingness to pay for winning may recruit star players and a highly skilled manager.
The presence of repeat observations raises the possibility that one could control for manager fixed effects and thereby at least partially control for this potential endogeneity problem. This was done by estimating the within-manager effects of the interaction between payroll and manager's playing ability as well as experience interactions with playing ability and payroll. While we attempted such a model and largely obtained qualitatively similar results to those present below, the results were imprecise, perhaps because in each league, there were only 40-95 individual managers who had multiple years of data. In contrast, there were, overall, 84-143 managers in the total samples within each league. Note that even though the manager's level of play remains constant across observations for the same manager, its interactions with payroll and experience can change, allowing for the estimation of within-manager effects.
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Of course, even fixed effects analysis may not fully control for endogenous matching if the factors that influence team and manager turnover decisions change over 9 Our basic models are estimated deleting any observations with missing data during these sample periods. However, as discussed below, we also estimate some models where we keep the missing data and assign values using multiple imputation techniques. 10 Making the manager fixed effects the focus of the analysis (as in studies such as Porter and Scully's 1982 examination of baseball managers) would be insufficient for our purposes. This is the case, since we have hypothesized that the manager's productivity varies depending on the type of team being managed as well as on the specific dimension of skill being studied. Perhaps this is due to the fact that in our case, managerial skill is comprised of several dimensions that we hypothesize interact with team type. The data evidently can't support a model with several endogenous regressors. Therefore the possibility of endogeneity biases remains, and below, we discuss whether such biases could help explain our results. Table 1 shows mean values for selected variables by league. There is a clear sorting of higher playing ability among managers, higher payroll for current players, and a larger amount of managerial experience leading a team into the more elite leagues.
Results
Specifically, the incidence of playing at Tier 1 (i.e. Tables 2-5 show frontier production function results for equations 1) and 2).
Looking first at the Premier League, the first model in Table 2 Table 2 , we find that moving from the 25 th to the 75 th payroll level improves the team's position at the mean of standings by about 3.7
places. This is a noticeable effect in a 22 team league. The effects of managerial expertise are insignificant individually and jointly in this specification, which of course constrains their effect to be the same at all payroll and managerial experience levels.
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The next specification adds managerial experience to the factors that potentially influence productive inefficiency; while the coefficient on experience has the expected negative sign (i.e., managerial experience on average lowers productive inefficiency), it is not significant. 12 The 20:1 payroll ratio is based on the raw means for real payroll. 13 This insignificance contrasts with the results of Dawson and Dobson (2002) who found that having played at an international level was associated with more managerial efficiency. Their finding was based on a model which pooled various levels of English football. When we pooled the four leagues (results available on request), we indeed found in some models that having played at Tier 2 led to significantly less efficiency than having played at Tier 1, a similar result to Dawson and Dobson (2002) . However, the findings shown below suggest that it is inappropriate to pool the different leagues. In addition, when we added a dummy variable for whether the manager played for the current team, we found a significantly positive effect on efficiency, as Dawson and Dobson (2002) did, while the other results were unchanged. However, as argued above, we believe that this variable is endogenous and should not be included.
While the first two specifications for productive inefficiency do not show significant main effects for managerial expertise or experience, the third specification shows that player skill significantly interacts with the manager's expertise in bringing the team closer to its productive potential. Specifically, in affecting productive inefficiency, player payroll has negative interaction effects with the manager's playing ability at levels 2, 3, and 4, all relative to managers who played at the top level (the log relative payroll main inefficiency effect). Moreover, the interactions are monotonically increasing in absolute value, ranging from -0.308 for level 2 to -2.412 for managers who didn't play.
And the interactions for levels 3 and 4 are significant at the 0.8% and 3.6% levels respectively, on two tailed tests. The interaction effect for managers who didn't play is large in magnitude. For example, the impact of a 75-25 increase in player pay lowers productive inefficiency by 1.67 log points more for a manager who didn't play versus a manager who played at level 1, or by about 81 percentage points.
14 The main effect of log payroll in the analysis of productive inefficiency is the impact of payroll for teams managed by former top level players. It also is significantly negative; in conjunction with the negative interactions for each of the lesser playing ability types of managers, we find evidence that in addition to directly affecting potential output, better paid players enable teams to achieve results closer to their potential. Of course this division of the impact of player skills into direct effects on potential output and indirect effects through their impact on productive efficiency is dependent on the production function model being correct. However, the result does shed light on the routes through which worker and manager skills lead to organizational success.
The fourth specification in Table 2 adds an interaction between player payroll and the manager's experience. This effect is negative and significant at the 2.8% level. A 75-25 change in the manager's experience is roughly 9 years (i.e. 13 vs. 4 years' managing experience), implying that the interaction coefficient of -0.100 represents a large effect indeed. Adding the experience-payroll interaction effect does, however, reduce the size of the payroll-manager's playing ability interactions by about a third for Tiers 3 and 4 and by 81% for level 2. The payroll-manager's playing ability interactions still increase monotonically in magnitude as the manager's playing ability decreases from Tier 1 to Tier 4, and remain statistically significant for levels 3 and 4 (at the 2.9% and 4.6% levels respectively). Finally, there do not seem to be any important managerial experience-managerial playing ability interaction effects, although adding these variables raises the standard errors on the payroll-manager's playing ability interactions without affecting their magnitude.
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The basic results for the Premier League, then, suggest the following conclusions.
First, teams really do receive something in return for a higher payroll, both directly on potential output and indirectly by having a more technically efficient team (i.e., one which achieves at a level closer to its potential). Second, managerial playing skill raises productive efficiency by more for teams with lower quality than higher quality players.
And, third, managerial experience raises productive efficiency by more for more highly skilled players. These disparate interaction effects suggest that there are multiple dimensions of managerial skill. On the one hand, the interactions for managerial playing quality and team payroll for players suggest that leaders who are experts at the sport have more to teach lesser skilled than more skilled players. The more highly skilled players, as indicated by a higher payroll, benefit less from a manager who was a great player, since these players already know how to play well. On the other hand, the effects of 15 The three experience-managerial playing ability interactions were insignificant as a group as well as individually. In Table 2 , last column, the three payroll-managerial playing level interactions become steadily more negative as the manager's playing level declines, as in the earlier models in the Table. However, in the fully-specified model, these three interactions are individually and jointly insignificant. Nonetheless, the pattern of point estimates holds up, and they are largely significant in the earlier models.
managerial experience suggest that long time managers know how to manage the egos of star players. More experienced managers bring more highly skilled players closer to their potential than when they manage less highly skilled players. Either such knowledge was obtained through on the job learning or managers who are better at managing big egos are selected by the Premier League teams to have long careers.
While it is possible that endogenous matching could explain these results, it would need to be a very peculiar kind of matching. Specifically, managers who were great players and highly experienced managers must have opposite matching effects with team type to provide a consistent, competing explanation to the one we have emphasized.
This is the case, since these two aspects of managerial skill have oppositely-signed interaction effects with player quality. an increase in payroll of this magnitude would also have effects at least as large for the 16 When we pooled the leagues and estimated the fully-specified model (i.e. the last model in Tables 2-5) , we found that, relative to managers who played in the Premier League, managers who played at level 2 significantly raised the productivity of lower paid teams more than higher paid teams; however, the other manager playing level-current payroll interactions were insignificant and increasing algebraically. But more experienced managers significantly raised the productivity of high payroll teams more than low payroll teams, as in Table 2 . As noted, however, the differences in the results across Tables 2-5 suggest that one shouldn't pool the leagues.
Premier League as for the other leagues. In addition to positively affecting potential output, player payroll also appears to raise productive efficiency in Tiers 2-4, as it did for the Premier League, with several of the effects being statistically significant and large in magnitude. Moreover, at Tier 3, there is a large, negative main effect of managerial experience on inefficiency that is statistically significant. Specifically, the second model in Table 4 shows a coefficient on managerial experience of -0.227 with a standard error of 0.109. For the year 2000, the 75-25 gap in experience for Tier 3 is 5.5 years (i.e. 6.5
vs. 1), implying that an increase of this magnitude in experience lowers inefficiency by about 1.1 log points, or 67 percentage points. Finally, again for Tier 3, Table 4 shows that player payroll has a significantly larger effect in lowering inefficiency for managers who played at Tier 2 vs. Tier 1. The direction of this effect is similar to the impact in the Premier League, although for the Tier 3 league, the interactions do not rise monotonically as the manager's playing skill declines. 17 Finally, the payroll-managerial playing level interactions are insignificant individually and as a group in Tiers 2 and 4.
The finding of stronger payroll-manager playing skill and managerial experiencepayroll interactions for the Premier League than for the other leagues deserves further comment. Specifically, we have interpreted the positive manager experience-payroll effects in the Premier League as reflecting an experienced manager's ability to manage the egos of highly paid players. It is intuitive that such egos will be more on display at the top levels of the Premier League than in the lower leagues, making it plausible that we would observe this effect to a greater degree at the top level of play. On the other hand, the negative interactions between managerial playing ability and player payroll 17 As suggested by Dawson, Dobson and Gerrard (2000b) , managerial efficiency may not be constant over time. When we reestimated our models adding a time trend for the determination of inefficiency, the results in every case were small and statistically insignificant. In addition, when we included a dummy variable for having played forward professionally, its effects were insignificant, unlike Dawson and Dobson (2002) . Moreover, when we used raw points as the dependent variable (draws plus 3 times wins), the results for the interactions between payroll and managerial playing skill and payroll and managerial experience were very similar to those presented above.
suggest, we have argued, that managers who were great players have more to teach lesser players than more accomplished current players. One might have expected such effects to be stronger in the lesser leagues, where the players presumably have more to learn than in the Premier League. Perhaps the answer is in the nature of the instruction that a manager who was a top level player provides to lesser players in the Premier League relative to lesser players in the lower level leagues. In the Premier League, players compete for higher stakes than in the other leagues, and lesser players in the top league may have more to learn about how to compete in such an environment than in the lower leagues.
As noted earlier, in some cases, there were missing data for player payroll, amounting to 6 cases for the Premier League (2% of the observations), 40 cases for level 2 (9%), 27 cases for level 3 (11%), and 71 cases for level 4 (30%). In addition, there was one missing case for the manager's experience level for the Premier League. In Appendix Tables A1-A4 , we show frontier production function results where we employ multiple imputation techniques suggested by Rubin (1987) to use the observed data on the explanatory variables to impute values for the missing data. The results in Tables A1)-A4) are quite similar in magnitude to those in Tables 2-5, although they are less statistically significant. Thus, our basic findings do not appear to be an artifact of the sample with complete data.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have used data on British football managers over the [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] period to study the issue of substitution and complementarity between leaders and subordinates. This setting is a particularly fruitful one for examining such production relationships because we have clear data on each organization's performance (i.e., its finishing position during the current season) and the type of both production and managerial labor inputs used.
Our strongest results are for the Premier League (the highest level of competition) and show that, other things being equal, managers who played at a higher level raise the productivity of lesser skilled teams by more than they do of more highly skilled teams.
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that one of the functions of a highly skilled manager is to teach subordinates some of the skills needed to succeed. The value of this teaching is, according to our results, greater the less skilled the players are. Such a result, which we believe is a new one, seems intuitively plausible. An additional finding, however, suggests that other things being equal (including the manager's playing ability), managers with more accumulated professional managing experience raise the productivity of more skilled players by more than that of less skilled players. This finding is consistent with the idea that another role of successful managers in highpressure, high-performance workplaces may be to manage the egos of the workers involved. Such a role is likely to be more critical the more accomplished the workers are, as indicated in our data by teams with higher relative payroll levels. While our results apply to average team skills, as proxied by its relative payroll level, a fruitful topic for future research is to study which players' performance is enhanced most by better managers. Relative position is defined as the difference between the log of team's finishing position and the average of the logs of the finishing positions of the teams in each given year. Finishing position is defined in direct order of success (i.e. a higher value means a better finish). Therefore a negative coefficient in the technical inefficiency analysis actually represents more technical efficiency. Explanatory variables are each defined relative to the league average for each year. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 20 replications. ***, **, and * mean, respectively, that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5 % or 10% level, two tailed tests. Relative position is defined as the difference between the log of team's finishing position and the average of the logs of the finishing positions of the teams in each given year. Finishing position is defined in direct order of success (i.e. a higher value means a better finish). Therefore a negative coefficient in the technical inefficiency analysis actually represents more technical efficiency. Explanatory variables are each defined relative to the league average for each year. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 20 replications. ***, **, and * mean, respectively, that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5 % or 10% level, two tailed tests. Relative position is defined as the difference between the log of team's finishing position and the average of the logs of the finishing positions of the teams in each given year. Finishing position is defined in direct order of success (i.e. a higher value means a better finish). Therefore a negative coefficient in the technical inefficiency analysis actually represents more technical efficiency. Explanatory variables are each defined relative to the league average for each year. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 20 replications. ***, **, and * mean, respectively, that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5 % or 10% level, two tailed tests. Relative position is defined as the difference between the log of team's finishing position and the average of the logs of the finishing positions of the teams in each given year. Finishing position is defined in direct order of success (i.e. a higher value means a better finish). Therefore a negative coefficient in the technical inefficiency analysis actually represents more technical efficiency. Explanatory variables are each defined relative to the league average for each year. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 20 replications. ***, **, and * mean, respectively, that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5 % or 10% level, two tailed tests. Relative position is defined as the difference between the log of team's finishing position and the average of the logs of the finishing positions of the teams in each given year. Finishing position is defined in direct order of success (i.e. a higher value means a better finish). Therefore a negative coefficient in the technical inefficiency analysis actually represents more technical efficiency. Explanatory variables are each defined relative to the league average for each year. All variables involving pay and experience imputed. 10 imputations are performed, but only 7 could be used in the second stage equations, due to. convergence problems. All non-imputed explanatory variables are used as predictors in the imputations. ***, **, and * mean, respectively, that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5 % or 10% level, two tailed tests. Relative position is defined as the difference between the log of team's finishing position and the average of the logs of the finishing positions of the teams in each given year. Finishing position is defined in direct order of success (i.e. a higher value means a better finish). Therefore a negative coefficient in the technical inefficiency analysis actually represents more technical efficiency. Explanatory variables are each defined relative to the league average for each year. All variables involving pay and experience imputed. 10 imputations are performed. All non-imputed explanatory variables are used as predictors in the imputations. ***, **, and * mean, respectively, that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5 % or 10% level, two tailed tests. Relative position is defined as the difference between the log of team's finishing position and the average of the logs of the finishing positions of the teams in each given year. Finishing position is defined in direct order of success (i.e. a higher value means a better finish). Therefore a negative coefficient in the technical inefficiency analysis actually represents more technical efficiency. Explanatory variables are each defined relative to the league average for each year. All variables involving pay and experience imputed. 10 imputations are performed. All non-imputed explanatory variables are used as predictors in the imputations. ***, **, and * mean, respectively, that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5 % or 10% level, two tailed tests. Relative position is defined as the difference between the log of team's finishing position and the average of the logs of the finishing positions of the teams in each given year. Finishing position is defined in direct order of success (i.e. a higher value means a better finish). Therefore a negative coefficient in the technical inefficiency analysis actually represents more technical efficiency. Explanatory variables are each defined relative to the league average for each year. All variables involving pay and experience imputed. 5 imputations are performed. All non-imputed explanatory variables are used as predictors in the imputations. ***, **, and * mean, respectively, that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5 % or 10% level, two tailed tests.
